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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, ex rel., 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel. 
ROBIN KIRBY, 
Petitioners/Appellees, 
v. 
AVI ALEX JACOBY, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Case No. 980157-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1996) . 
Defendant seeks review of the Judgment and Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court entered February 6, 1998. 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 5, 1998. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the 
determination of this case: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-604 (1) 
and -604(2) (Supp. 1998). The full text of the statute is set 
forth in Addendum A to this brief. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED/STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act controlled this case, rather than the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which was 
repealed by the Utah legislature effective July 1, 199"/? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of 
law. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and 
are given no special deference on appeal. Bingnam v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
Did the trial court correctly rule that Jacoby was person-
ally served with the State's order to show cause under UIFSA? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of 
fact. Appellate courts give great deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact in divorce cases and ao nc: 
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Barnes 
v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). 
Did the trial court correctly rule that it had both subject-
matter jurisdiction of the case and personal jurisdiction over 
Jacoby?. 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a conclusion of 
law. The standard of review is correction of error with 
no deference given. Bingham, 872 P.2d at 1067. 
Did the trial court correctly rule that Pennsylvania law, 
which has no statute of limitations applicable to enforcement 
of child support, applies to this case, rather than the Utah 
eight-year statute of limitation? 
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Standard of Review: This issue presents a conclusion cf 
law, which is reviewed for correctness with no deference 
given. Bingham, Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah, at the request of the State of 
Pennsylvania, initiated an action to enforce the child support 
provisions of the parties' Virginia divorce decree. The action 
was initiated on May 12, 1997, under the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement cf Support Act ("URESA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 :o 
77-31-39 (1995), with the filing of a motion and order to show 
cause, accompanied by an affidavit attesting to the arrearage 
calculation and a transmittal packet1 prepared by the State of 
Pennsylvania (the "URESA order to show cause"). (R- at 1-58, 371). 
1
 Robin Elizabeth Kirby v. Avi Alexander Jacoby, Chancery 
No. 3706-85, Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield. (R. at 
41-58). The parties were married in Pennsylvania in 1980. (R. 
at 41). At the time petitioner Robin Kirby filed a complaint for 
divorce, both parties were living in Virginia and the complaint 
was filed in Virginia. (R. at 42). In light of Robin Kirby's 
subsequent return to Pennsylvania, at the time of entry of the 
final decree on July 24, 1987, the Virginia court transferred 
jurisdiction of matters of child support and custody to the Court 
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (R. at 44). 
Pennsylvania took jurisdiction of the matters of child support 
and custody, substantial litigation ensued in that state and 
Jacoby was ultimately incarcerated there for failure to pay child 
support. (Tr. at 21). Jacoby subsequently moved to Utah. (Tr. 
at 10). Pennsylvania then requested the State of Utah to 
initiate this action. (R. at 23-24) . 
2
 The transmittal packet consisted of: the child support 
enforcement transmittal; the petition; the affidavit of Robin 
Kirby; and a certified copy of the Virginia final decree of 
divorce, the related stipulation between the parties, and an 
accompanying order. 
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Respondent/Appellant Avi Alex Jacoby was personally served with the 
URESA order to show cause on May 20, 1997. (R. at 22, 371). 
Effective April 29, 1996, the Utah legislature enacted the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") which was intended 
to ultimately supplant URESA. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-100 through 
901 (Supp. 1998). At the time the URESA order to show cause was 
filed, both URESA and UIFSA were in effect in Utah. Effective July 
1, 1997, the Utah legislature repealed URESA. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-31-1 through 39 (1997 Supp.). 
On October 8, 1997, Utah filed a motion and order to show 
cause under UIFSA seeking enforcement of the Virginia decree and 
substantially the same relief (the "UIFSA order to show cause"), 
except that the second order to show cause sought the additional 
remedies of contempt for failure to pay child support and 
suspension of Jacoby's driver's, professional and recreational 
licenses. (R. at 66-128, 371). The UFISA order to show cause was 
accompanied by the same transmittal packet from the State of 
Pennsylvania as was filed with the URESA order to show cause. 
Jacoby was personally served with the UIFSA order to show cause on 
October 22, 1997. (R. at 129, 372). 
The URESA order to show cause sought a judgment against Jacoby 
in the amount of $59,287.00 representing accrued child support 
arrears for the period December 1985 through April 1997. (R. at 2). 
The UIFSA order to show cause sought a judgment against Jacoby in 
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the amount of $54,287.05, representing child support due and owing 
for the period December 1985 through June 1997. (R. at 111). 
Both orders to show cause were accompanied by affidavits of the 
agent of the Office of Recovery Services who compiled the 
computations substantiating the arrearage amounts." Both were 
accompanied by the same URESA transmittal packet prepared by the 
State of Pennsylvania. (R. at 6-18; 113-124). 
A hearing on the URESA order to show cause was held on June 
25, 1997, before Commissioner Lisa A. Jones. The State sought a 
judgment in the amount of $59,287 against Jacoby for child support 
arrears for the period of December 1985 through April 1997 in light 
of the fact that Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the 
collection of child support. Jacoby raised the issue as to whether 
the Utah eight-year statute of limitations should apply to the 
arrearage calculation, which would significantly lower the judgment 
amount. The commissioner recommended that the legal issue of the 
statute of limitations, as well as the amounts due and owing for 
child support prior to the eight-year period and after the eight-
year period, be certified for evidentiary hearing. (Tr. of 6/25/97 
hearing at 4-6). An evidentiary hearing was held on October 8, 
3
 The arrearage amounts in the two computations are 
different in that the later computation reflects payments and 
credits during the period April through June 1997. 
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1997, on the above-noted issues. Jacoby did not appear and his 
default was entered. (Tr. at 5). 
Jacoby then arrived twenty-five minutes late for the hearing. 
Counsel for the State agreed to set aside the default and the court 
proceeded with the hearing. (Tr. at 7). Jacoby again raised the 
issue of the applicable statute of limitations. The court heard 
the arguments of Jacoby and counsel for the State. Jacoby 
testified and was cross-examined by counsel for the State. (Tr. at 
8-22). At the conclusion of testimony and argument, the court 
requested Jacoby and counsel for the State to brief the issues. 
(Tr. at 26). The hearing was continued to December 8, 1997. (Tr. 
at 32) . 
At the December 8th hearing, the court heard the arguments cf 
Jacoby and counsel for the State. (Tr. at 34-42). Because the 
court had not had an opportunity to review the briefs, the court 
took the matter under advisement. (Tr. at 43). The court noteo 
that it would review the briefs and rule based upon the hearing and 
the briefs. (Tr. at 43). In addition, the court allowed the State 
and Jacoby to submit supplemental briefs. (Tr. at 47). The court 
asked the parties to submit proposed findings and orders. (Tr. at 
47). The court noted that if it felt further argument was 
4
 All citations to the transcript are to the transcript of 
the October 8, 1997, and December 8, 1997, hearings unless 
otherwise noted. 
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necessary, another hearing would be scheduled, or the court would 
rule on the papers as submitted. (Tr. at 48). 
Prior to the December 8, 1997, hearing, on December 1, 1997, 
Jacoby filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a motion for 
judicial determination of applicable law, seeking a ruling: (1) 
that the Utah eight-year statute of limitations applied to these 
proceedings; (2) that petitioner Robin Kirby was not entitled to 
spousal support during periods when she cohabited with a person of 
the opposite sex; and (3) that Jacoby was entitled to a 50% 
reduction in his child support obligation for time periods when the 
children visited with him for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive 
days by order of the court or written agreement of the parties. 
(R. at 136-138, 240-242). Jacoby put the issues of cohabitation 
and extended visitation before the court for the first time in this 
motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on December 8, 1997, 
he argued these issues before the court. (Tr. at 38-39). The issue 
of spousal support, however, was not before the court in that the 
State was seeking a judgment only for child support arrears. 
On February 4, 1998, the court made its minute entry and filed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and order, and 
found, in pertinent part, that: (1) Jacoby's ongoing spousal 
support obligation terminated in September 1989, when petitioner 
Robin Kirby remarried; (2) Jacoby was personally served with the 
State's URESA order to show cause on May 20, 1997; (3) Jacoby was 
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personally served with the State's UIFSA order to show cause on 
October 22, 1997; (4) the court had personal jurisdiction over 
Jacoby, as well as subject matter jurisdiction; (5) UIFSA is the 
controlling law of the case; (6) Pennsylvania law, which contains 
no statute of limitation for the recovery of child support, applies 
to the case and is determinative of the support arrears owed by 
Jacoby. (R. at 366-373). The court entered judgment against 
Jacoby in the amount of $55,887.05, representing child support 
arrears for the period from December 1985 through November 1997. 
(R. at 375-376). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act ("UIFSA") controls this action for the 
enforcement of Jacoby's child support obligation. UIFSA and its 
predecessor statute, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act ("URESA"), were both in effect when the State of Utah filed the 
action to enforce the parties' Virginia divorce decree in 199"7; 
however, URESA was subsequently repealed and UIFSA is now the 
controlling law in interstate child support collection cases in 
Utah. While the action was initially filed under URESA, Jacoby was 
subsequently served with an order to show cause under UIFSA. UIFSA 
should, therefore, be the controlling law of the case. Even if a 
second order to show cause under UIFSA had not been filed and 
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served, UIFSA is a procedural, not a substantive, change to the law 
and, therefore, may be applied retroactively. 
The trial court had the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction over Jacoby for purposes of UIFSA. The 
court already had subject-matter jurisdiction as a result of the 
State's initiation of an action under URESA, and the State's 
subsequent filing under UIFSA substantially conformed with federal 
requirements under UIFSA. Furthermore, the trial court found that 
Jacoby was properly served with notice of the UIFSA filing, and the 
return of service supports this factual determination. 
The trial court also correctly ruled that Pennsylvania has no 
statute of limitations pertaining to the collection of support 
arrearages and, since the Pennsylvania limitations period is 
therefore longer than Utah's eight-year statute of limitations, 
Pennsylvania law applies to this case under UIFSA. 
Finally, the court lacked statutory authority to modify the 
spousal support and visitation provisions of the parties' Virginia 
decree. Utah must give full faith and credit to the provisions of 
the Virginia decree regarding spousal support and visitation and 
cannot interpret those provisions in light of Utah law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UIFSA, NOT 
URESA, IS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The trial court concluded that UIFSA, not URESA, is the 
controlling law applicable to the case. (R. at 372). Jacoby 
argues that URESA, not UIFSA, applies to this case because: (1) the 
case was initially filed under URESA; (2) he was not properly 
served with the UIFSA order to show cause, thus, the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over him; (3) the UIFSA forms filed by the 
Stats and served on Jacoby were "fatally defective," and thus the 
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; (4) appli-
cation cf UIFSA affects his substantive rights, thus, the Act 
cannot be applied retroactively. Jacoby's arguments are without 
merit. 
A. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA) Was The Controlling Law in Utah 
for Interstate Enforcement Actions When 
This Action Was Filed; It Should be the 
Controlling Law for This Case. 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) is a 
comprehensive uniform act focusing on the interstate establishment, 
modification, and enforcement of child support obligations. It 
5
 As child support obligors became increasingly mobile, the 
difficulties associated with the enforcement of child support 
obligations also increased. As a result, in 1950, the National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform Laws promulgated a model 
act which later was enacted in every state as URESA. URESA was 
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has now been enacted into law by all fifty states. Utah enacted 
UIFSA and it became effective on April 29, 1996. At that time, 
URESA was also available for enforcement purposes. The Utah 
legislature repealed URESA effective July 1, 1997. Since that 
date, UIFSA is the controlling law in Utah for the enforcement of 
support orders in an interstate case. 
The State initially filed this action under URESA, but 
subsequently filed and served an order to show cause under UIFSA, 
seeking the additional remedies of contempt for failure to pay 
child support, and suspension of Jacoby's driver's, professional, 
and recreational licenses. (R. at 128). UIFSA was the controlling 
law in the State of Utah when the second order to show cause was 
the first act that specifically addressed the issue of interstate 
enforcement of support orders. The Act made enforcement remedies 
available to all because it allowed enforcement without requiring 
the obligee parent to travel long distances for an enforcement 
action. 
Although URESA was helpful in facilitating interstate 
establishment and enforcement of support orders, it also resulted 
in problems, such as the creation of multiple child support 
orders in individual cases with support obligations in differing 
amounts. Thus, the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform Laws 
decided to replace URESA with a new model act, the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). Many of UIFSA's 
provisions represent new solutions to problems inherent in 
interstate establishment and enforcement of child support 
obligations under URESA. For example, UIFSA creates a structure 
designed to provide for only one support order at a time and in 
cases where there are multiple support orders, UIFSA provides 
rules for determination of the controlling order. 
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filed; UIFSA should be the controlling law applicable to this 
case. 
B. Even If The State Had Not Filed A Second Order 
to Show Cause Under UIFSA, UIFSA Should Be 
Applied Retroactively. 
Jacoby argues that because this action was initiated under 
URESA, URESA is the controlling law and UIFSA cannot be given 
retroactive application. While other states have addressed the 
issue of the retroactive application of UIFSA, this is a case of 
first impression in the Stare of Utah. Courts in Colorado, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina and Texas have given retroactive 
application to UIFSA. In Brenckle v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214, 675 
N.E. 2d 390 (Mass. 1997), the court noted that this "case raises 
questions about the relationship between successive Massachusetts 
statutes for the interstate enforcement of child support orders." 
675 N.E. at 391. In Brenckle, the obligor challenged a judgment 
for child support arrears entered by an Alaska court and enforced 
by a Massachusetts court. Id. The obligee commenced the action in 
Alaska under URESA, seeking to enforce the Alaska judgment in 
Massachusetts where the obligor resided. Id. at 391-392. On 
February 10, 1995, the Massachusetts court found the obligor to be 
liable in the amount of $107,365, the amount of the Alaska judgment 
with interest. Id. at 392. Effective that same date, the 
Massachusetts URESA statute was repealed and UIFSA enacted. Id. 
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Subsequently, the obligor appealed the lower court judgment. 
Thus, the Massachusetts appeals court confronted which law applied 
to the appeai--URESA, under which the action was commenced, or 
UIFSA, now in effect in Massachusetts. The appeals court 
determined that UIFSA should be applied retroactively. The 
Massachusetts UIFSA statute specifically provides that "any URESA 
action that is Spending or was previously adjudicated . . . may be 
transferred to the probate and family court department . . . and 
[ujpon transfer' the provisions of UIFSA shall apply." Id. at 393. 
The Massachusetts appeals court noted, however, that the case had 
not been transferred to the family court, but found that the 
legislature intended retroactive application of the statute, and 
relied on general principles of statutory construction, noting that 
UIFSA is a remedial statute not affecting substantive rights and, 
thus, should be applied retroactively. Id. But see Pavlovich v. 
Pavlovich, 932 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 1997), wher e the court declined to 
give retroactive application to UIFSA.' 
A Colorado court in In Interest of R.H.L., 942 P.2d 1386 
(Colo. App. 1997), relied on reasoning similar to the Brenckle 
court in reaching the conclusion that the Colorado UIFSA statute 
should be applied retroactively: 
6
 Pavlovich involved the modification of a child support 
order in which the court would have lost jurisdiction under 
UIFSA's concept of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 932 P.2d 
at 1086, n, 9. See also Deltoro v. McMullen, 322 S.C. 328, 471 
S.E.2d 742. (S.C. App. 1996). 
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The replacement of URESA and RURESA [Revised URESA] 
by UIFSA did nor expand the permissible scope of 
issues to be addressed in interstate child support 
enforcement proceedings. To the contrary, the goal 
of the new law was to provide mechanisms to address 
problems, such as multiple or conflicting support 
orders as to the same parties and children, that 
had persisted in the interstate enforcement of 
support under RURESA. 
Id. at 1388. In Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119. (Texas App. 
1995), a Texas court held that UIFSA rather than revised URESA 
governed the procedure for the registration of a foreign child 
support decree issued prior to UIFSA's effective date and filed in 
Texas after the effective date, as the foreign decree was entered 
when the responding state rendered judgment, rather than when the 
foreign court rendered the decree. 903 S.W.2d at 122. The court 
applied UIFSA even though tne initiating state used URESA forms. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Welsher v. 
Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 491 S.E. 2d 661 (1997), held that UIFSA 
governs all proceedings over any foreign support order which is 
registered in North Carolina after the effective date of UIFSA. 
491 S.E.2d at 664. The court explained, "our interpretation saves 
the courts from the arduous task of attempting to determine 
arrearage based on the application of two different sets of law to 
the same order." Id. at 665. 
While Utah courts have not yet specifically addressed the 
question of the retroactive application of UIFSA, the issue has 
been addressed with respect to other statutes. The general rule in 
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Utah is that "a legislative enactment which alters the substantive 
law cr affects vested rights will not be read to operate 
retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed that 
intention." Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061-1062 {Utah 
(1995). However, where a statute is procedural only, and does not 
affect substantive rights, the courts have recognized an exception 
to the general rule. In Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court noted: "A contrary rule applies where 
a statute changes only procedural law by providing a different: mode 
or form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights. Such 
remedial statutes are generally applied retrospectively to accrued 
or pending actions to further the Legislature's remedial purpose." 
Id. at 455. 
Such is the case here. URESA was created to seek enforcement 
of foreign support orders as obligors moved from state to state. 
UIFSA was created to streamline that same process. "UIFSA did not 
expand the permissible scope of issues to be addressed in 
interstate child support enforcement proceedings," as the Colorado 
7
 Jacoby appears to argue that by giving retroactive 
application to UIFSA and applying Pennsylvania law, which has no 
statute of limitations for child support collections, rather than 
Utah's eight-year statute, his substantive rights are affected. 
(Appellant's brief at 32). Petitioner Robin Kirby's rights had 
already accrued under Pennsylvania and Virginia law when the 
Virginia divorce decree was registered in 1987. Kirby now merely 
seeks to enforce her substantive rights. Jacoby's substantive 
rights are not affected under UIFSA any more than they are under 
URESA: an order had already been entered against him. 
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Court of Appeals recognized in In Interest of R.H.L., 942 P.22 at 
1388. Thus, the retroactive application of UIFSA in this case is 
entirely appropriate, and in accord with established principles of 
staiurory construction. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That It Had 
Both Personal Jurisdiction Over Jacoby and 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Case. 
Jacoby argues that he was not personally served with the 
State's UIFSA order to show cause and thus maintains that the trial 
court had neither personal jurisdiction over him nor subject matter 
jurisdiction under UIFSA. Jacoby's reasoning is flawed. 
1. The Trial Court Had Personal Jurisdiction 
Over Jacoby Because He Was Personally 
Served with Both of the State's Orders to 
Show Cause—Under URESA and Under UIFSA. 
The trial court found that Jacoby was personally served with 
both of the State's orders to show cause, under URESA and under 
UIFSA. (R. at 372). The returns of service support the court's 
findings (R. at 22, 129). Appellate courts give great deference to 
the trial court's findings of fact in divorce cases and do not 
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Barnes v. Barnes, 
877 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). A finding of fact will be 
adjudged clearly erroneous only if it violates the standards set by 
the appellate court, is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or the reviewing court is "left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed" even though there is evidence 
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to support the finding. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P. 2d at 472, 476 
(Utah App. 1991). A party seeking to overturn the trial court's 
factual findings has the burden of marshaling the evidence which 
supports the findings and then demonstrating that, despite such 
evidence, the findings are nevertheless so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence. Hagan v. Hagan, 81G 
P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991). 
Jacoby has not marshaled any evidence. He has merely reargued 
his position, asserting again on appeal that he was not served with 
the State's UIFSA order to show cause, a contention obviously 
contrary to the evidence and to the trial court's finding of fact. 
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.d 598, 603 (Utah App. 1994), 
this Court held that a husband who had merely reargued evidence 
supporting his position had not marshaled evidence. Jacoby has 
failed to meet his marshaling requirement. Thus, the findings of 
Jacoby claims that service of the UIFSA order to show 
cause was defective, in part, because the address on the upper 
right-hand corner inserted by the constable along with his 
signature and the date and time of service is Jacoby's office 
address, whereas the return of service shows his home address 
(Appellant's brief at 36). Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires the person making service to endorse upon the 
copy the time and date of service and sign the copy. The address 
on the copy is not of any consequence. The return of service is 
the constable's affidavit testifying to the date and place of 
service. Since there is no dispute that both addresses are 
Jacoby's, it is unclear why this discrepancy would make service 
defective. 
In addition, Jacoby argues that service of process on 
October 22, 1997, for a hearing scheduled for October 29, 1997, 
"falls woefully short on letter and meaning of due notice 
provision of the United States and Utah Constitutions." 
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the trial court that Jacoby was personally served with both of the 
State's orders to show cause—under URESA and under UIFSA—must be 
upheld. 
In any event, whether or not personal service under UIFSA was 
defective, Jacoby made a general appearance before the court on 
December 8, 1998. He claims he made only a limited appearance for 
the purpose of objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction. 
However, the transcript of the record reveals that he argued every 
substantive issue that was before the court. (Tr. at 36-40; 44-47). 
His appearance was thus a general appearance and he submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blaneney Corp., 547 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976;; Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. The Trial Court Had Statutory Authority 
to Act in this Matter and Thus Had Proper 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
The trial court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
in this case. (R. at 372). Subject matter jurisdiction is 
conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-102, -203 and -304 (Supp. 
1998). 
Jacoby argues that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under UIFSA because the papers that were served on him 
(Appellant's brief at 37). Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides notice of hearings on motions shall be served 
at least five days before the scheduled hearing. The State met 
the requirements of Rule 6. 
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under UIFSA were "fatally defective." He claims that the State's 
UIFSA order to show cause was defective because it was accompanied 
by the same transmittal packet prepared by the State of 
Pennsylvania as accompanied the URESA order to show cause. It is 
not material that the transmittal forms were URESA forms. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45f-101 (7) (Supp. 1998). All that is required under 
UIFSA is that: "The petition must specify the relief sought. The 
petition and the accompanying documents must conform substantially 
with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law 
for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45f-311 (Supp. 1998). The State's UIFSA order to show 
cause and the accompanying documents substantially complied with 
UIFSA requirements. 
Jacoby was properly served and received notice of the action 
against him under both URESA and UIFSA, and the trial court so 
found. Jacoby has not met his marshaling burden. The clear weight 
of the evidence supports the trial court's findings, which must be 
upheld. The court had both personal jurisdiction over Jacoby and 
subject matter jurisdiction of the case. 
9
 Jacoby further argues that the trial court did not yet 
have subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA at the December 8, 
1997, hearing because the December 8th hearing was a continuance 
of the October 8, 1997, hearing and the State did not file its 
UIFSA order to show cause until October 8, 1997. This argument 
is patently frivolous. 
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D. To Effectuate the Remedial Purposes of the Act, 
UIFSA Must be Construed As the Controlling Law 
Applicable to this Case. 
In order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act, it is 
imperative that Utah courts apply UIFSA to all cases pending or 
initiated under URESA. The purpose of the Act is to achieve 
uniformity among txhe various states in the enforcement of child and 
spousal support orders. While UIFSA as enacted by the Utah 
legislature does not specifically provide for the retroactive 
application of UIFSA to cases filed under URESA, a provision of the 
statute implies that is what the legislature intended: 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law 
with respect to the subject of this chapter among the 
states enacting it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-90i (Supp. 1998). This language strongly 
suggests that it was the intent of the legislature in enacting 
UIFSA and repealing URESA that UIFSA apply to ail cases filed or 
pending under URESA. To apply URESA after its repeal to the 
substantial number of cases that were initiated under URESA would 
be in derogation of the purposes of UIFSA--to make uniform the law 
with respect to child support enforcement. Thus, to effectuate the 
remedial purposes of the Act, UIFSA must be construed as the 
controlling law in this case, and in all other cases now pending in 
Utah courts that were initiated under URESA. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
GOVERNS THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER UIFSA. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Pennsylvania law governs 
the limitations period under UIFSA. Pennsylvania has no statute of 
limitations applicable to child support arrearages. UIFSA 
specially provides that NN[i]n a proceeding for arrearages, the 
statute of limitations under the laws of this state or of the 
issuing state, v/hichever is longer, applies." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45f-604(2) (emphasis added). Because Pennsylvania has no 
limitations period applicable to child support collections and Utah 
has an eight-year statute of limitations, Pennsylvania law provides 
the longer limitations period, and, thus, under UIFSA, Pennsylvania 
law should apply. The trial court so found: "the State of 
Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the recovery of 
child support and . . . this fact is determinative of the support 
arrears owed by the Defendant." (R. at 372.) 
Jacoby argues that Utah's eight-year statute of limitations is 
applicable to this action for the collection of accrued child 
support arrears. His reasoning is flawed. He attempts to 
demonstrate that Pennsylvania's "catch-all", six-year statute of 
limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5527, should be considered controlling 
in that jurisdiction. Under Jacoby's reasoning, Utah's eight-year 
10
 The result would have been the same if the court had 
applied Virginia law. 
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statute of limitations would apply under UIFSA as it would be the 
longer of the two statutes. 
Jacoby misguidedly relies on a decision of the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court in Morrisey v. Morrisey, 679 A.2d 234 (Pa. Super. 
199c), in which the court found that a four-year statute of 
limitations prevented the registration in Pennsylvania of a Texas 
child support order. That decision was reversed in Morrisey v. 
Morrisey ("Morrisey II") , A.2d , 1998 WL 315411 (Pa. 1998), in 
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: held that the four-year 
statute applicable to actions upon judgments did not bar 
registration and enforcement of the Texas child support order. 
Mrs. Morrisey had registered her Texas support order in 
Pennsylvania under RURESA (revised URESA) and sought to collect 
approximately $22,000.00 in arrearages. The Superior Court 
concluded that Mrs. Morrisey was entitled only to arrearages that 
had accrued since April 1991, four years prior to the date that 
registration had occurred. In reversing the Superior Court, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that RURESA's express purpose 
of improving and extending by reciprocal legislation the 
enforcement of duties of support was served by requiring 
Pennsylvania courts to afford foreign support orders the same 
effect as domestic orders. Id. The court stated, "Thus, under 
RURESA, a properly registered foreign support order: ^shall be 
treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of 
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this Commonwealth.'" Id. at 2. The court concluded that "the 
four-year statute applicable to actions upon judgments does not bar 
registration and enforcement of the Texas support order pursuant to 
RURESA. This interpretation comports with the legislature's intent 
to maintain substantially equal access and the means to enforce 
support obligations as between children residing in Pennsylvania 
and children residing in other states." Id. 
Jacoby attempts to use the Pennsylvania six-year statute as a 
shield against satisfying an ongoing obligation of eleven years, 
despite the fact that the provision applies to the commencement of 
civil actions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5527. To allow the statute to 
provide Jacoby a shield from his ongoing, court-ordered obligation 
would be contrary to the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in Morrisey II. 
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the 
determination of the trial court that Pennsylvania has no statute 
of limitations applicable to child support collections and, thus, 
under UIFSA, Pennsylvania law applies rather than Utah's eight-year 
statute of limitations. 
11
 Jacoby appears to argue that under either URESA or UIFSA, 
Utah law should control since he has resided in the State of Utah 
during most of the period in question. (Appellant's brief at 
38). Jacoby's argument is without merit. If this Court deter-
mines that URESA is the controlling law applicable to this case, 
then Utah law with its eight-year statute of limitations will 
apply. Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-7 (1990). If this Court determines 
that UIFSA is the controlling law, then Pennsylvania law, which 
contains no statute of limitations for the collection of child 
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III. 
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS JURISDICTION TO MODIFY SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
AND VISITATION PROVISIONS OF THE PARTIES' VIRGINIA DECREE. 
The parties' Virginia divorce decree specifically provides for 
the conditions upon which spousal support shall terminate: "the 
husband's death, the wife's death, her remarriage, her graduation 
from medical school or June 30, 1992, whichever occurs first." (R. 
at 49). The decree also provides for visitation rights. The 
decree does not mention cohabitation as a condition for termination 
cf spousal support. Nor does the decree provide for a reduction in 
child support during periods of extended visitation. 
Utah law provides for termination of spousal support upon 
cohabitation and a fifty-percent reduction in child support for 
periods when a child lived with the noncustodial parent for 25 out 
of 30 consecutive days. Jacoby seeks a ruling from this Court 
reading those provisions into his Virginia divorce decree. 
The Virginia decree must be enforced by its terms, and not in 
light of Utah law. Under UIFSA, Utah courts lack "continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction" over spousal support orders and may not 
modify such orders. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-206 (3) (Supp. 1998). 
Thus, Utah lacks jurisdiction over Jacoby's spousal support order 
and cannot modify it or interpret it in light of Utah law. Those 
modifications must be sought from the Virginia courts. 
support, will apply. 
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Finally, a judgment for spousal support arrears was not sought 
in this action and thus the issue of the amount of spousal support 
arrears is not before this court. With respect to visitation, even 
if Utah's provision for a 50% reduction in child support during the 
periods of extended visitation were applicable to Jacoby's decree, 
Utah law requires either a court order for extended periods of 
visitation or a written agreement between the parties. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.11 (Supp. 1998). Jacoby has neither. 
Utah courts cannot reopen and relitigate the merits of the 
spousal support award and the visitation provisions of the existing 
order. This is exclusively an enforcement proceeding. Utah must 
give full faith and credit to the Virginia decree. Jacoby's only 
purpose in asking the Court to retroactively apply Utah law is to 
obtain credits against his support which are specifically excluded 
in the divorce decree. This the Court cannot do. Thus, Jacoby's 
request for such a ruling from this Court must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah urges this Court 
to affirm the judgment and order of the trial court, including the 
judgment against Jacoby and in favor of petitioner Robin Kirby, and 
the finding that UIFSA is the controlling law applicable to this 
case. 
Because Utah courts have not yet addressed the question of the 
application of UIFSA to cases initiated or pending under URESA, the 
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State requests oral argument and believes a published opinion is 
warranted. . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // day of September, 1996. 
'.CJLJO* 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
8-45M00. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Interstate Family Support Act." 
History: C. 1953, 77-3la-100, enacted by 
1996, ch. 149, § 2; renumbered by L. 
1997, ch. 232, § 83. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this 
78-45M01. Definitions. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
100. 
Effective Dates. —- Laws 1996, ch. 149 
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Child" means an individual, whether over or under the age of 
majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the 
individual's parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support 
order directed to the parent. 
(2) "Child support order" means a support order for a child, including a 
child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing 
state. 
(3) "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or imposable by law 
to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an 
unsatisfied obligation to provide support. 
(4) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or 
a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for 
support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the 
child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of 
any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other period. 
(5) "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money 
from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support 
under the law of this state. 
(6) "Income-withholding order" means an order or notice directed to an 
obligor's employer directing the employer to withhold support from the 
income of the obligor in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4 or 
Part 5. 
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(7) "Initiating state" means a state from which a proceeding is for-
warded or in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding 
state under this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this 
chapter, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the 
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
(8) "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in an initiating 
state. 
(9) "Issuing state" means the state in which a tribunal issues a support 
order or renders a judgment determining parentage. 
(10) "Issuing tribunal" means the tribunal that issues a support order 
or renders a judgment determining parentage. 
(11) "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regula-
tions having the force of law. 
(12) "Obligee" means: 
(a) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be 
owed or in whose favor a support order has been issued or a judgment 
determining parentage has been rendered; 
(b) a state or political subdivision to which the rights under a duty 
of support or support order have been assigned or which has indepen-
dent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual 
obligee; or 
(c) an individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the 
individual's child. 
(13) "Obligor" means an individual, or the estate of a decedent who: 
(a) owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support; 
(b) is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child; 
or 
(c) is liable under a support order. 
(14) "Register" means to file a support order or judgment determining 
parentage in the district court. 
(15) "Registering tribunal" means a tribunal in which a support order is 
registered. 
(16) "Responding state" means a state m which a proceeding is filed or 
to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state under 
this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
(17) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in a respond-
ing state. 
(18) "Spousal-support order" means a support order for a spouse or 
former spouse of the obligor. 
(19) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or 
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The 
term includes an Indian tribe and a foreign jurisdiction that has enacted 
a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support 
orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this 
chapter. 
(20) "Support enforcement agency" means a public official or agency 
authorized to seek: 
(a) enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of 
support; 
(b) establishment or modification of child support; 
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(c) determination of parentage; or 
(d) to locate obligors or their assets. 
(21) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or order, whether 
temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the benefit of a child, a 
spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health 
care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related costs and 
fees, interest, income withholding, attorney's fees, and other relief. 
(22) "Tribunal" means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial 
entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to 
determine parentage. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-101, enacted by "or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 3; renumbered by L. ment of Support Act"; rewrote Subsection (16); 
1997, ch. 232, § 84. added "the United States Virgin Islands" and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- "enacted a law or" in Subsection (19); and made 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this stylistic changes. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
101; added "or Part 5" in Subsection (6); in became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
Subsection (7) added "or procedure" and added Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45M02. Tribunal of state. 
The district court and the Department of Human Services are the tribunals 
of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-102, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 4; renumbered by L. 102. 
1997, ch. 232, § 85. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-103. Remedies cumulative. 
Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the 
availability of remedies under other law. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-103, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 5; renumbered by L. 103. 
1997, ch. 232, § 86. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION 
78-45f-201. Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident. 
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support order or to 
determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident individual, or the individual's guardian or conservator, 
if: 
(1) the individual is personally served with notice within this state; 
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by 
entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having 
the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction; 
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state; 
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(4) the individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses 
or support for the child; 
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of 
the individual; 
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the 
child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse; 
(7) the individual asserted parentage in the putative father registry 
maintained in this state by the state registrar of vital records in the 
Department of Health pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption; or 
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this 
state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
History: C 1953, 77-31a-201, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 6; renumbered by L. 201. 
1997, ch. 232, § 87. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-202. Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over 
nonresident. 
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence 
from another state, and Section 78-45-318 to obtain discovery through a 
tribunal of another state. In all other respects, Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not 
apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this 
state, including the rules on choice of law other than those established by this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-202, enacted by 202, and changed the section references to 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 7; renumbered by L. reflect the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 88. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
78-45f-203. Initiating and responding tribunal of state. 
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating 
tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and as a responding tribunal 
for proceedings initiated in another state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-203, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 8; renumbered by L. 203. 
1997, ch. 232, § 89. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-204. Simultaneous proceedings in another state. 
(1) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to' establish a support 
order if the petition is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in 
another state only: 
(a) if the petition in this state is filed before the expiration of the time 
allowed in the other state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the 
exercise of jurisdiction by* the other state; 
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(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction 
in the other state; and 
(c) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child. 
(2) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a 
support order if the petition is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is 
filed in another state: 
(a) if the petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed 
before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a 
responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state; 
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction 
in this state; and 
(c) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the child. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-204, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 10; renumbered by L. 204. 
1997, ch. 232, § 90. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of 
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: 
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the 
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is 
issued; or 
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written 
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to 
modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
(2) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order consistent with the 
law of this state may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order 
if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law 
substantially similar to this chapter. 
(3) If a child support order of this state is modified by a tribunal of another 
state pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this 
state loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective 
enforcement of the order issued in this state, and may only: 
(a) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts accruing before 
the modification; 
(b) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and 
(c) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that order which 
occurred before the effective date of the modification. 
(4) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive juris-
diction of a tribunal of another state which has issued a child support order 
pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter. 
(5) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a 
jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the 
issuing tribunal. 
(6) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of 
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order 
throughout the existence of the support obligation. A tribunal of this state may 
not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-205, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 11; renumbered by L. 205, and made stylistic changes. 
1997, ch. 232, § 91. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-206. Enforcement and modification of support or-
der by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction. 
(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a 
tribunal of another state to enforce or modify a support order issued in that 
state. 
(2) A tribunal of this state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a 
support order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce or modify the order. 
If a party subject to the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal no 
longer resides in the issuing state, in subsequent proceedings the tribunal may 
apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence from another state and Section 
78-45f-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another state. 
(3) A tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
over a spousal support order may not serve as a responding tribunal to modify 
a spousal support order of another state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-206, enacted by 206, and made section reference changes to 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 12; renumbered by L. reflect the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 92. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
78-45f-207. Recognition of controlling child support or-
der. 
(1) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and only one tribunal has 
issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so 
recognized. 
(2) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two or more child 
support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state or another state with 
regard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the 
following rules in determining which order to recognize for purposes of 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: 
(a) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal controls and 
must be so recognized. 
(b) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, an order issued by a tribunal in the 
current home state of the child controls and must be so recognized, but if 
an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the 
order most recently issued controls and must be so recognized. 
(c) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
under this chapter, the tribunal of this state having jurisdiction over the 
parties shall issue a child support order, which controls and must be so 
recognized. 
(3) If two or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor 
and child and if the obligor or the individual obligee resides in this state, a 
party may request a tribunal of this state to determine which order controls 
and must be so recognized under Subsection (2). The request must be 
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accompanied by a certified copy of every support order in effect. The requesting 
party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be 
affected by the determination. 
(4) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under Subsection (1), (2), 
or (3) is the tribunal that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under Section 
78-45f-205. 
(5) A tribunal of this state which determines by order the identity of the 
controlling order under Subsection (2)(a) or (b) or which issues a new 
controlling order under Subsection (2)(c) shall state in that order the basis 
upon which the tribunal made its determination. 
(6) Within 30 days after issuance of an order determining the identity of the 
controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it 
with each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support. 
A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject to 
appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. 
The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling 
order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-207, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 13; renumbered by L. 207, and rewrote the section. 
1997, ch. 232, § 93. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-208. Multiple child support orders for two or more 
obligees. 
In responding to multiple registrations or petitions for enforcement of two or 
more child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same 
obligor and different individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a 
tribunal of another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders m 
the same manner as if the multiple orders had been issued by a tribunal of this 
state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-208, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 14; renumbered by L. 208. 
1997, ch. 232, § 94. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-209. Credit for payments. 
Amounts collected and credited for a particular period pursuant to a support 
order issued by a tribunal of another state must be credited against the 
amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under a support order issued 
by the tribunal of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-209, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 15; renumbered by L. 209. 
1997, ch. 232, § 95. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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PART 3 
CIVIL PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION 
78-45f-301. Proceedings under chapter. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this part applies to all 
proceedings under this chapter. 
(2) This chapter provides for the following proceedings: 
(a) establishment of an order for spousal support or child support 
pursuant to Part 4; 
(b) enforcement of a support order and income-withholding order of 
another state without registration pursuant to Part 5; 
(c) registration of an order for spousal support or child support of 
another state for enforcement pursuant to Part 6; 
(d) modification of an order for child support or spousal support issued 
by a tribunal of this state pursuant to Sections 78-45f-203, 78-45f-204, 
78-45f-205, and 78-45f-206; 
(e) registration of an order for child support of another state for 
modification pursuant to Part 6; 
(f) determination of parentage pursuant to Part 7; and 
(g) assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant to Sections 
78-45f-201 and 78-45f-202. 
(3) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may com-
mence a proceeding authorized under this chapter by filing a petition in an 
initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a 
petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state which 
has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-301, enacted by 301. and changed section references to reflect 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 16; renumbered by L. the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 96. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996. ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
78-45f-302, Action by minor parent. 
A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor 
parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor's 
child. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-302, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 17; renumbered by L. 302. 
1997, ch. 232, § 97. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-303. Application of law of state. 
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding tribunal of this 
state shall: 
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on 
choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in 
this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available 
in those proceedings; and' 
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(2) determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accor-
dance with the law and support guidelines of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-303, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 18; renumbered by L. 303. 
1997, ch. 232, § 98. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-304. Duties of initiating tribunal. 
(1) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an initiating 
tribunal of this state shall forward three copies of the petition and its 
accompanying documents: 
(a) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement 
agency in the responding state; or 
(b) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state 
information agency of the responding state with a request that they be 
forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged. 
(2) If a responding state has not enacted this chapter or a law or procedure 
substantially similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this state may issue a 
certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the 
^sponding state. If the responding state is a foreign jurisdiction, the tribunal 
.ay specify the amount of support sought and provide the other documents 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding state. 
History; C. 1953, 77-31a-304, enacted by 304, added Subsection (2), and made related 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 19; renumbered by L. redesignations. 
1997, ch. 232, § 99. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
78-45f-305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal. 
(1) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or compa-
rable pleading from an initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to Subsection 
78-45f-301(2)(c), it shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the 
petitioner where and when it was filed. 
(2) A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent otherwise authorized by 
law, may do one or more of the following: 
(a) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, or 
render a judgment to determine parentage; 
(b) order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the 
amount and the manner of compliance; 
(c) order income withholding; 
(d) determine the amount of any arrearages and specify a method of 
payment; 
(e) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both; 
(f) set aside property for satisfaction of the support order; 
(g) place liens and order execution on the obligor's property; 
(h) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor's 
current residential address, telephone number, employer, address of 
employment, and telephone number at the place of employment; 
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(i) issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed after proper 
notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the bench 
warrant in any local and state computer systems for criminal warrants; 
(j) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified 
methods; 
(k) award reasonable attorneys' fees and other fees and costs; and 
(1) grant any other available remedy. 
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued 
under this chapter, or in the documents accompanying the order, the calcula-
tions on which the support order is based. 
(4) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a 
support order issued under this chapter upon compliance by a party with 
provisions for visitation. 
(5) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this chapter, 
the tribunal shall send a copy of the order to the petitioner and the respondent 
and to the initiating tribunal, if any. 
History* C. 1953, 77-31a-305, enacted by petitioner" in Subsection (1), deleted "by first 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 20; renumbered by L. class mail" after "the order" in Subsection (5), 
1997, ch. 232, § 100. and changed a section reference to reflect the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- renumbering of this chapter, 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
305, deleted "by first class mail" after "the Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-306. Inappropriate tribunal. 
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal 
of this state, it shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an 
appropriate tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner 
where and when the pleading was sent. 
History: C. 1953, 77«31a-306, enacted by 306, and deleted "by first class mail" after "the 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 21; renumbered by L. petitioner." 
1997, ch. 232, § 101. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
78-45f-307. Duties of support enforcement agency. 
(1) A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide 
services to a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter. 
(2) A support enforcement agency that is providing services to the petitioner 
as appropriate shall: 
(a) take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal in this 
state or another state to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent; 
(b) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time, and place for a 
hearing; 
(c) make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, includ-
ing information as to income and property of the parties; 
(d) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holi-
days, after receipt of a written notice from an initiating, responding, or 
registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice to the petitioner; 
(e) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holi-
days, after receipt of a written communication from the respondent or the 
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respondent's attorney, send a copy of the communication to the petitioner; 
and 
(f) notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot be 
obtained. 
(3) This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of attorney and 
client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or 
the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-307, enacted by 307, and substituted "ten days" for "two days" 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 22; renumbered by L. and deleted "by first class mair before "to the 
1997, ch. 232, § 102. petitioner" in Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-308. Duty of attorney general. 
If the attorney general determines that the support enforcement agency is 
neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general 
may order the agency to perform its duties under this chapter or may provide 
those services directly to the individual. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-308, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 23; renumbered by L. 308. 
1997, ch. 232, § 103. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-309. Private counsel. 
An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in 
proceedings authorized by this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-309, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 24; renumbered by L. 309. 
1997, ch. 232, § 104. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-310. Duties of state information agency. 
(1) The Office of Recovery Services is the state information agency under 
this chapter. 
(2) The state information agency shall: 
(a) compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the 
tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under this chapter and any 
support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state 
information agency of every other state; 
(b) maintain a register of tribunals and support enforcement agencies 
received from other states; 
(c) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the place in this state in 
which the individual obligee or the obligor Tesides, or in which the obligor's 
property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding 
under this chapter received from an initiating tribunal or the state 
information agency of the initiating state; and 
(d) obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the 
obligor's property within this state not exempt from execution, by such 
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means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, exami-
nation of telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address from 
employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the 
extent not prohibited by law, those relating to real property, vital records, 
law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses, and Social 
Security number. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-310, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 25; renumbered by L. 310. 
1997, ch. 232, § 105. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-311. Pleadings and accompanying documents. 
(1) A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support order or to 
determine parentage in a proceeding under this chapter must verify the 
petition. Unless otherwise ordered under Section 78-45f-312, the petition or 
accompanying documents must provide, so far as known, the name, residential 
address, and Social Security numbers of the obligor and the obligee, and the 
name, sex, residential address, Social Security number, and date of birth of 
each child for whom support is sought. The petition must be accompanied by a 
certified copy of any support order in effect. The petition may include any other 
information that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent. 
(2) The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompa-
nying documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed 
by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support 
enforcement agency. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-311, enacted by 311, and changed a section reference to reflect 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 26; renumbered by L. the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 106. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
78-45f-312. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Upon a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the health, safety, or 
liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure 
of identifying information, or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall 
order that the address of the child or party or other identifying information not 
be disclosed in a pleading or other document filed in a proceeding under this 
chapter. 
History? C. 1953, 77-31a-312, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 27; renumbered by L. 312. 
1997, ch. 232, § 107. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-313. Costs and fees. 
(1) The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or other costs. 
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(2) If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal may assess against an 
obligor filing fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, other costs, and necessary travel 
and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee's 
witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the 
obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the 
responding state, except as provided by law. Attorney's fees may be taxed as 
costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the 
order in the attorney's own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has 
priority over fees, costs, and expenses. 
(3) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a 
proceeding under Part 6 a hearing is presumed to have been requested 
primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced 
without change. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-313, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 28; renumbered by L. 313. 
1997, ch. 232, § 108. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-314. Limited immunity of petitioner. 
(1) Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a responding 
tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided 
by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over 
the petitioner in another proceeding. 
(2) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically 
present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this chapter. 
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation 
based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this chapter committed by a 
party while present in this state to participate in the proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-314, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 29; renumbered by L. 314. 
1997, ch. 232, § 109. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-315. Nonparentage as defense. 
A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or 
pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding 
under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-315, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 30; renumbered by L. 315. 
1997, ch. 232, § 110. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-316. Special rules of evidence and procedure. 
(1) The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding tribunal of this 
state is not required for the establishment, enforcement, or modification of a 
support order or the rendition of a judgment determining parentage. 
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(2) A verified petition, affidavit, or document substantially complying with 
federally mandated forms, and a document incorporated by reference in any of 
them, not excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in 
evidence if given under oath by a party or witness residing in another state. 
(3) A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy of 
the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding 
tribunal. The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it and is admissible to show 
whether payments were made. 
(4) Copies of bills for testing for parentage, and for prenatal and postnatal 
health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten 
days before trial, are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges 
billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary. 
(5) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a tribunal of 
this state by telephone, telecopier, or other means that do not provide an 
original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on 
the means of transmission. 
(6) In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may permit a 
party or witness residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by 
telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated 
tribunal or other location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate 
with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate location for the 
deposition or testimony. 
(7) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the 
ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may 
draw an adverse inference from the refusal. 
(8) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does 
not apply in a proceeding under this chapter. 
(9) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife 
or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-316, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, & 111. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-317. Communications between tribunals. 
A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal of another state in 
writing, or by telephone or other means, to obtain information concerning the 
laws of that state, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that 
tribunal, and the status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of this 
state may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal of 
another state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-317, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 31; renumbered by L. 317. 
1997, ch. 232, § 112. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-318. Assistance with discovery. 
A tribunal of this state may: 
(1) request a tribunal of another state to assist in obtaining discovery; 
and 
(2) upon request, compel a person over whom it has jurisdiction to 
respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal of another state. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-318, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3ia. 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 32; renumbered by L. 318. 
1997, ch. 232, § 113. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-319, Receipt and disbursement of payments. 
A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse 
promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the 
order. The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of 
another state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the 
amounts and dates of all payments received. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-319, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 33; renumbered by L. 319. 
1997, ch. 232, § 114. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
PART 4 
ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER 
78-45f-401. Petition to establish support order. 
(1) If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been 
issued, a responding tribunal of this state may issue a support order if: 
(a) the individual seeking the order resides in another state; or 
(b) the support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in 
another state. 
(2) The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if: 
(a) the respondent has signed a verified statement acknowledging 
parentage; 
(b) the respondent has been determined by or pursuant to law to be the 
parent; or 
(c) there is other clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is 
the child's parent. 
(3) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor 
owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the 
obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to Section 78-45f-305. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-401, enacted by 401, and changed a section reference to reflect 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 34; renumbered by L. the redesignation of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 115. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
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PART 5 
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE 
WITHOUT REGISTRATION 
78-45f-501. Employer's receipt of income-withholding or-
der of another state. 
An income-withholding order issued in another state may be sent to the 
person or entity defined as the obligor's employer under Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Part 4, Income Withholding, without first filing a petition or comparable 
pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-501, enacted by sent," and deleted provisions prescribing the 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 35; renumbered by L. employer's duties upon receipt of the withhold-
1997, ch. 232, § 116. ing order. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
501, deleted "by first class mail" after "may be 
78-45f-502. Employer's compliance with income with-
holding of another state. 
(1) Upon receipt of an income withholding order, the obligor's employer shall 
immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor. 
(2) The employer shall treat an income withholding order issued in another 
state which appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of 
this state. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4) and Section 78-45f-503, 
the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the 
withholding order by complying with terms of the order which specify: 
(a) the duration and amount of periodic payments of current child 
support, stated as a sum certain; 
(b) the person or agency designated to receive payments and the 
address to which the payments are to be forwarded; 
(c) medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment, 
stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance 
coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor's 
employment; 
(d) the amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support 
enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, and the obligee's attorney, stated 
as sums certain; and 
(e) the amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on 
arrearages, stated as sums certain. 
(4) An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor's 
principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to: 
(a) the employer's fee for processing an income withholding order; 
(b) the maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor's 
income; and 
(c) the times within which the employer must implement the withhold-
ing order and forward the child support payment. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-502, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 117. * 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
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78-45f-503. Compliance with multiple income withhold-
ing orders. 
If an obligor's employer receives multiple income withholding orders with 
respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the employer satisfies the terms of 
the multiple orders if the employer complies with the law of the state of the 
obligor's principal place of employment to establish the priorities for the 
withholding and allocating income withheld for multiple child support 
obligees. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-503, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 118. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-504. Immunity from civil liability. 
An employer who complies with an income withholding order issued in 
another state in accordance with this part is not subject to civil liability to an 
individual or agency with regard to the employer's withholding of child support 
*Vom the obligor's income. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-504, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 119. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-505. Penalties for noncompliance. 
An employer who willfully fails to comply with an income withholding order 
issued by another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same 
penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a 
tribunal of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-505, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 120. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-506. Contest by obligor. 
(1) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income 
withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer 
in this state in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal 
of this state. Section 78-45f-604 applies to the contest. 
(2) The obligor shall give notice of the contest to: 
(a) a support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee; 
(b) each employer that has directly received an income withholding 
order; and 
(c) the person or agency designated to receive payments in the income 
withholding order or if no person or agency is designated, to the obligee. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-506, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 121. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-507. Administrative enforcement of orders. 
(1)A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding 
order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another state may send the documents 
required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state. 
193 UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 78-45f-602 
(2) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without 
initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use 
any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a 
support order or an income-withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not 
contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the 
obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the 
support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-502, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 36; renumbered by L. 502. 
1997, ch. 232, § 122. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
PART 6 
ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT 
ORDER AFTER REGISTRATION 
78-45f-601. Registration of order for enforcement. 
A support order or an income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of 
another state may be registered in this state for enforcement. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-601, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 37; renumbered by L. 601. 
1997, ch. 232, § 123. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-602. Procedure to register order for enforcement. 
(1) A support order or income-withholding order of another state may be 
registered in this state by sending the following documents and information to 
the appropriate tribunal in this state: 
(a) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and 
enforcement; 
(b) two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders to be registered, 
including any modification of an order; 
(c) a sworn statement by the party seeking registration or a certified 
statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any 
arrearage; 
(d) the name of the obligor and, if known: 
(i) the obligor's address and Social Security number; 
(ii) the name and address of the obligor's employer and any other 
source of income of the obligor; and 
(iii) a description and the location of property of the obligor in this 
state not exempt from execution; and 
(e) the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or 
person to whom support payments are to be remitted. 
(2) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall 
cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of the 
documents and information, regardless of their form. 
(3) A petition seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought under law 
of this state may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or 
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy sought. 
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History2 C. 1953, 77-31a-602, enacted by 602, and substituted "appropriate tribunal" fop 
* 1996, ch. 149, § 38; renumbered by L. "district court" in the introductory paragraph in 
1997, ch. 232, § 124. Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-603. Effect of registration for enforcement. 
(1) A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state is 
registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state. 
(2) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same 
manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal 
of this state. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal of this state shall 
recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing 
tribunal had jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-603, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 39; renumbered by L. 603. 
1997, ch. 232, § 125. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-604. Choice of law. 
(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and 
duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the 
payment of arrearages under the order. 
(2) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws 
of this state or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies. 
History^ C. 1953, 77-31a-604, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 40; renumbered by L. 604. 
1997, ch. 232, § 126. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-605. Notice of registration of order* 
(1) When a support order or income-withholding order issued in another 
state is registered, the registering tribunal shall notify the nonregistering 
party. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and 
the documents and relevant information accompanying the order. 
(2) The notice must inform the nonregistering party: 
(a) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in 
the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state; 
(b) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the regis-
tered order must be requested within 20 days after notice; 
(c) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered 
order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and 
enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages and precludes further 
contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have been 
asserted; and 
(d) of the amount of any alleged arrearages. 
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(3) Upon registration of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the 
registering tribunal shall notify the obligor's employer pursuant to Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Part 4, Income Withholding. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-605, enacted by must be given in Subsection (1), and deleted 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 41; renumbered by L. "the date of mailing or personal service of the" 
1997, ch. 232, § 127. after a20 days after" in Subsection (2Kb). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
605, deleted a sentence specifying how notice 
78-45f-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement 
of registered order. 
(1) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of 
a registered order in this state shall request a hearing within 20 days after 
notice of the registration. The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the 
registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the 
registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any 
alleged arrearages pursuant to this section. 
(2) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of 
the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of 
law. 
(3) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or 
enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of 
the hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-606, enacted by 606, deleted references to a mailing of the 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 42; renumbered by L. notice requirement, and made a stylistic 
1997, ch. 232, § 128. change. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-607. Contest of registrat ion or enforcement. 
(1) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or 
seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the 
following defenses: 
(a) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting 
party; 
(b) the order was obtained by fraud; 
(c) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order; 
(d) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal; 
(e) there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought; 
(f) full or partial payment has been made; or 
(g) the statute of limitation under Section 78-45f-604 precludes enforce-
ment of some or all of the arrearages. 
(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under 
Subsection (1), a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered order, 
continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, 
and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered 
order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this state. 
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(3) If the contesting party does not establish a defense under Subsection (1) 
to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering tribunal shall issue 
an order confirming the order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-607, enacted by 607, and made a section reference change to 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 43; renumbered by L. reflect the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 129. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
78-45f-608. Confirmed order. 
Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after 
notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any 
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-608, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 44; renumbered by L. 608. 
1997, ch. 232, § 130. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-609. Procedure to register child support order of 
another state for modification. 
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and 
enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order 
in this state in the same manner provided in Sections 78-45f-601, 78-45f-602, 
78-45f-603, and 78-45f-604 if the order has not been registered. A petition for 
modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or 
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for modification. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-609, enacted by 609, and made section reference changes to 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 45; renumbered by L. reflect the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 131. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996. ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
78-45f-610. Effect of registration for modification. 
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state 
registered for purposes of modification, in the same manner as if the order had 
been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered order may be modified 
only if the requirements of Section 78-45f-611 have been met. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-610, enacted by 610, and made a section reference change to 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 46; renumbered by L. reflect the renumbering of this chapter. 
1997, ch. 232, § 132. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29. 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
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78-45f-611. Modification of child support order of another 
state. 
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in 
this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if 
Section 78-45f-613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that: 
(a) the following requirements are met: 
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in 
the issuing state; 
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modifica-
tion; and 
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
tribunal of this state; or 
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are 
individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a 
tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state is a 
foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or established procedures 
substantially similar to the procedures under this chapter, the consent 
otherwise required of an individual residing in this state is not required 
for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to modify the child support order. 
(2) Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same 
requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an 
order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and 
satisfied in the same manner. 
(3) A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support 
order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state. If two or 
more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, 
the order that controls and must be so recognized under Section 78-45f-207 
establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable. 
(4) On issuance of an order modifying a child support order issued in 
another state, a tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal of continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-611, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 47; renumbered by L. 611, and rewrote the section. 
1997, ch. 232, § 133. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-612. Recognition of order modified in another 
state. 
A tribunal of this state shall recognize a modification of its earlier child 
support order by a tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction 
pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter and, upon request, 
except as otherwise provided in this chapter, shall: 
(1) enforce the order that was modified only as to amounts accruing 
before the modification; 
(2) enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order; 
(3) provide other appropriate relief only for violations of that order 
which occurred before the effective date of the modification; and 
(4) recognize the modifying order of the other state, upon registration, 
for the purpose of enforcement. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-612, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3ia. 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 48; renumbered by L. 612. 
1997, ch. 232, § 134. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45f-613. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of 
another state when individual parties reside in 
this state. 
(1) If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child 
does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to 
enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to 
register that order. 
(2) A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this section shall 
apply the provisions of Parts 1 and 2, this part, and the procedural and 
substantive law of this state to the proceeding for enforcement of modification. 
Parts 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 do not apply. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-613, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 135. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
78-45f-614. Notice to issuing tribunal of modification. 
Within 30 days after issuance of a modified child support order, the party 
obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the 
issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier 
order, and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been 
registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is 
subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to 
file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the 
modified order of the new tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-614, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, 
L. 1997, ch. 232, fc 136. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
PART 7 
DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE 
78-45f-701. Proceeding to determine parentage. 
(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating or responding tribunal 
in a proceeding brought under this chapter or a law substantially similar to 
this chapter or the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, to 
determine that the petitioner is a parent of a particular child or to determine 
that a respondent is a parent of that child. 
(2) In a proceeding to determine parentage, a responding tribunal of this 
state shall apply Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and the rules 
of this state on choice of law. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-701, enacted by 701, and deleted "Title 77, Chapter 31" before 
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 49; renumbered by L. "the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
1997, ch. 232, § 137. port Act" in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, ex rel., 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel. 
ROBIN KIRBY, 
Plaintiffs, 
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AVI ALEX JACOBY, 
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 970902869 
Judge WILLIAM BOHLING 
Comm LISA A. JONES 
The foregoing matter came before the court upon the State of Utah's Notice to Submit for 
Decision pursuant to rule 4-501 (d) of the Code of Judicial Administration. The court having previously 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon the legal briefs and reply 
briefs from both parties, the argument of counsel and after due and full consideration of the facts and 
good cause appearing now therefore; 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. A judgment shall enter against the Defendant and in favor of the State of Utah for the use and 
benefit of the initiating jurisdiction in the sum of $55,887.05, representing child support arrears for the 
period from December 1985 through November 1997. 
2. The above judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 7.468 percent per annum. 
3. All support payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145-0001, unless the Office gives written notice that payment s should be sent 
elsewhere. 
4. Immediate and automatic income withholding shall apply for the collection is child support. 
5. The issue of the Defendant's contempt for failure to pay support continues to be certified for 
future hearing. 
DATED this \ day of / l U ^ M , 1998. 
<r 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM BOHLING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ' ^ day of ^^Uz4^<^>W , 1998,1 caused to be mailed a true and 
/ 
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the following individuals at the following 
addresses: 
Mr. Avi Alex Jacoby 
2318 0akcrestDrive 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
Mr. Avi Alex Jacoby 
9355 South 1300 East 
Sandy, Ut 84094 
Robin Kirby 
#2 Wallis Court 
Lexington, Ma 02173 
/yjiA. 
Myrna/Bright 
Legal/Secretary 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, ex rel., 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel. 
ROBIN KIRBY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AVI ALEX JACOBY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970902869 
Judge WILLIAM BOHLING 
Comm LISA A. JONES 
The foregoing matter came before the court upon the State of Utah's Notice to Submit for 
Decision pursuant to rule 4-501 (d) of the Code of Judicial Administration. The court having previously 
received legal briefs and reply briefs from both parties, heard argument of counsel and fully considered 
the record herein, the court now enters its 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that on December 2, 1985 a Virginia Order was entered that ordered the 
Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $600.00 per month per child and spousal support in the 
amount of $600.00 per month. 
2. On May 21, 1986, another order was entered that denied the Defendant's petition to terminate 
the spousal support award. However, there was a reduction in the total child and spousal support award 
from $1,800.00 to $1,200.00 per month. 
3. The Virginia Court entered the final Divorce Decree on July 24, 1987. The Decree, made 
pursuant to a stipulation of the parties on January 5, 1987, provided for child support in the amount of 
$400.00 per month per child and spousal support in the amount of $400.00 per month. 
4. The Stipulation forming the basis of the Decree of Divorce established: (1) the visitation 
provisions and specified no reduction of support during those periods, (2) support arrears up to January 
30, 1987, (3) spousal support arrears, and (4) the terms under which the spousal support would 
terminate. 
5. At the time of the entry of the Decree, the Virginia Court transferred jurisdiction of the 
matters of child support and custody to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania. 
6. On March 27, 1987, the Virginia court determined that the arrearage amount due at that date 
was $8,200.00. 
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7. On April 27, 1987, a Utah State Office of Recovery Services administrative judgment was 
docketed and entered in the Third District Court, State of Utah. The amount of the judgment was 
$8,200.00 and represented child and spousal support for the period from May 1, 1986 through March 31, 
1987. The Defendant stipulated to the judgment. 
8. Since the transfer of jurisdiction of the divorce issues to Pennsylvania, no changes have been 
made to the child or spousal support awards. 
9. The Defendant's ongoing spousal support obligation terminated with the month of September 
1989 because the ex rel. Plaintiff, Robin Kirby remarried. 
10. On April 25, 1997, ORS filed a Motion and Order to Show Cause pursuant to the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act seeking a judgment against the Defendant for support arrears in 
the amount of $54,287.00 for the period from December 1985 through April 1997. 
11. The Defendant was personally served with the Order to Show Cause on May 20, 1997. 
12. A hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on June 25, 1997 before Commissioner Lisa 
Jones. The Commissioner certified the issues of the statute of limitations and the amounts due prior to 
1989 for hearing before this court. 
13. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 8, 1997 before this court on the issues of the 
statute of limitations and the support amounts owing prior to 1989. The hearing was continued until 
December 8, 1997 and the State's attorney and the Defendant were instructed to submit legal briefs 
regarding the contested issues and the controlling law. 
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14. On October 22, 1997 the Defendant was served with a second Order to Show Cause, filed 
under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, which sought a judgment for support arrearage in the 
amount of $54,287.05 for the period from December 1985 through June 1997 and contempt for the 
Defendant's failure to pay his support obligation. 
15. The Defendant failed to appear at the second hearing and the issue of the Defendant's 
contempt for failure to pay is support obligations was certified for hearing before this court. 
16. The above facts support the court's finding that the Defendant in this case is a noncustodial 
parent pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered in the State of Virginia and that pursuant to several 
orders, including the Divorce Decree, the Defendant is required to pay child and spousal support. 
17. Based upon the legal briefs submitted in this case, the court finds that is has proper 
jurisdiction over the Defendant and over the subject matter in the case. 
18. The court finds that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") is the controlling 
law for this case. 
19. Based upon the legal briefs submitted in the case the court finds that the State of 
Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the recovery of child support and that this fact is 
determinative of the support arrears owed by the Defendant. 
20. Based upon the UIFSA Order to Show Cause, the affidavits and the support arrearage 
computations submitted by the State, the court finds that the Defendant owes support arrearages in the 
amount of $55,887.05 for the period from December 1985 through November 1997. Further, all other 
statutory provisions sought in the Order to Show Cause are appropriate. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court now concludes that, as a matter of law, it is 
appropriate that the court's judgment and order should be entered consistent with and embracing 
the foregoing findings of fact. 
DATED this *4 day of H ^ V U t p c ^ 1998. 
d 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM BOHLING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 
OF ALASKA [FN1] 
FN1. On behalf of Carol A. Brenckle. 
V. 
Joseph J. BRENCKLE, Jr. 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Suffolk. 
Argued Nov. 7, 1996. 
Decided Feb. 6, 1997. 
Child Support Enforcement Division of Alaska 
brought action on behalf of Alaska resident to collect 
unpaid child support payments from father residing 
in Massachusetts. The Brockton Division of District 
Court Department, David G. Nagle, J., entered 
judgment against father. Father appealed. After 
transfer from the Appeals Court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, Marshall, J., held that: (1) Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) applied 
retroactively to case; (2) UIFSA required no de 
novo or independent review into whether father 
owed child support before enforcing Alaska child 
support order; and (3) defense of laches was not 
available to father. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
[1] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(1) 
285k3.4(l) 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is remedial 
statute not affecting substantive rights and, thus, 
should be applied retroactively. M.G.L.A. c. 
209D, § 1-101 et seq. 
[2] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(2) 
285k3.4(2) 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act required no 
de novo or independent review by Massachusetts 
court into whether father owed child support before 
enforcing foreign child support order. M.G.L.A. c. 
209D, §6-601. 
[3] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(2) 
285k3.4(2) 
Divorced father's failure to make child support 
payments became vested as judgments by operation 
of law, and thus defense of laches was not available 
to him, despite contention that mother consciously 
chose to forfeit her rights to child support payments 
by making no attempt to contact him for 13 years. 
M.G.L.A. c. 119A, § 13(a, d). 
**390 Mary O'Sullivan Smith, Rockland, for 
defendant. 
Edward J. DeAngelo, Assistant Attorney General, 
for plaintiff. 
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, 
GREANEY and MARSHALL, JJ. 
*215 MARSHALL, Justice. 
This case raises questions about the relationship 
between successive Massachusetts statutes for the 
interstate enforcement of child support orders. The 
child support enforcement **391 division of Alaska 
brings the action on behalf of Alaska resident Carol 
A. Brenckle (Carol Brenckle) to collect unpaid child 
support payments from her former husband, Joseph 
J. Brenckle, Jr. (Brenckle), a resident of 
Marshfield. On appeal, Brenckle challenges 
findings of the District Court entered against him in 
the amount of $107,365 as determined under a 1991 
judgment of the Alaska Superior Court (Alaska 
court) and enforced by the court below. We affirm 
the judgment and remand this matter to the District 
Court, where it shall be transferred to the Probate 
and Family Court Department for such other 
proceedings as may be necessary to enforce the 
judgment. 
We summarize the pertinent facts. The couple was 
married on December 19, 1964, in California. In 
1971, they moved to Alaska, where they had one 
child, Joseph J. Brenckle, III (son), who was born 
on July 16, 1974. In May, 1978, they filed a joint 
petition for divorce which was granted by the Alaska 
court on July 17, 1978. 
Under the terms of the divorce agreement Carol 
Brenckle retained custody of their son, and Brenckle 
agreed to pay $500 each month for child support. 
The divorce agreement provided that child support 
would terminate when their son reached the age of 
majority, [FN2] and that the expenses for the child's 
education (preparatory school, college, and graduate 
school) would be shared jointly by both parents. 
The divorce agreement also provided for visitation 
arrangements between Brenckle and his son. 
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FN2. In both Alaska and Massachusetts the age of 
majority is eighteen years of age. See Alaska Stat. 
§ 25.20.010 (Michie 1996); G.L. c. 4, § 7, Fifty-
first. 
Soon after the divorce—the record is not specific— 
and in any event by January, 1979, Brenckle moved 
to Massachusetts, while Carol Brenckle remained in 
Alaska with their son. Brenckle made the required 
child support payments *216 for several months 
only. [FN3] It is undisputed that Brenckle made no 
child support payments after December, 1979. He 
stopped all payments at that time, he says, because 
one support payment sent to Carol Brenckle at her 
home address was returned to him marked 
"unclaimed," and he "assumed" either that she 
would contact him with a new address, or that "she 
no longer intended to accept the checks because of a 
changed and improved financial position." Brenckle 
apparently made no effort to determine whether his 
"assumption" was correct, or whether his support 
payments could be sent to an alternative address, 
such as the post office box mailing address listed by 
Carol Brenckle in the divorce agreement. 
According to Carol Brenckle, Brenckle had no 
communication with their son after May, 1979. 
Because she was financially able to support their son 
with her own earnings, she did not pursue 
enforcement of the delinquent child support 
obligations until their son prepared to go to college. 
FN3. The parties dispute the date of Brenckle's last 
payment of child support. He asserts that he made 
child support payments through December, 1979; 
Carol Brenckle maintains that the last support 
payment was made in May, 1979. Brenckle 
submitted copies of several "return receipt" 
certificates signed by Carol Brenckle in the last six 
months of 1979, but there is nothing to indicate the 
content of the mail she received. Brenckle's own 
affidavit concerning his 1979 child support 
payments is cursory and ambiguous. In any event, 
Brenckle has not challenged the amount of the 
judgment. 
In 1991, when their son turned seventeen years old 
and began to make plans to enter college, Carol 
Brenckle filed an action in the Alaska court to 
recover the child support arrearages owed to her 
because she could not afford to support him in 
college. [FN4] Brenckle was provided notice of 
those proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, 
but he did not enter an appearance or contest the 
proceedings. On December 19, 1991, the Alaska 
court entered judgment against Brenckle in the 
amount of $75,000, with interest. He has not 
challenged the validity of that judgment. 
FN4. Alaska law provides that unpaid periodic 
child support payments are judgments that become 
vested when each payment becomes due, Alaska 
Stat. § 25.27.225 (Michie 1996), and further 
provides for procedures for the collection of the 
past due payments by obtaining a judgment in the 
amount owed. Alaska Stat. § 25.27.226 (Michie 
1996). 
On June 30, 1992, Carol Brenckle filed a petition in 
Alaska under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act (URESA), **392 Alaska Stat. §§ 
25.25.010-25.25.100 (since repealed), *217 seeking 
to establish an enforcement order in Massachusetts, 
Brenckle's home State. The Alaska court certified 
the petition on September 18, 1992, and ordered it 
transmitted to the child support enforcement division 
of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
(department). 
The petition was entered in the Brockton District 
Court on June 8, 1993, and an order of notice was 
issued by that court to Brenckle and served on him 
in hand. On December 9, 1993, Brenckle filed his 
answer to the petition, and on March 4, 1994, he 
filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
The District Court denied his motion on March 16, 
1994. 
On November 16, 1994, the District Court judge 
conducted a hearing on the merits of the case; no 
testimony was received and, by agreement of the 
parties, the matter was submitted on memoranda and 
affidavits. On February 10, 1995, the judge found 
Brenckle liable in the amount of $107,365, the 
amount of the 1991 Alaska judgment with interest. 
Brenckle appealed. We transferred his appeal here 
on our own motion. 
This case reaches us in unusual circumstances. 
URESA, codified at G.L. c. 273A, this 
Commonwealth's previous statutory mechanism for 
issuing, modifying and enforcing interstate child 
support orders, was repealed on February 10, 1995, 
the same date that the judgment entered in the 
District Court. At the same time URESA was 
replaced by the Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act (UIFSA), codified at G.L. c. 209D, inserted by 
St. 1995, c. 5, § 87. We consider first which law 
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applies to this appeal. 
UIFSA was approved by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1992, 
and has since been adopted by twenty-six States, 
including Alaska and Massachusetts. [FN5] 9 
U.L.A. 255 (Master ed. Supp.1996). See G.L. c. 
209D; Alaska Stat. §§ 25.25.101 (Michie 1996). It 
was developed to improve the two prior uniform 
laws concerning enforcement of family support 
orders, URESA and the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act *218 
RURESA). [FN6] See Note, The Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act: The New URESA, 
20 U. Dayton L.Rev. 425, 448 (1994). UIFSA 
aims to cure the problem of conflicting support 
orders entered by multiple courts, and provides for 
the exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by 
one tribunal over support orders. See Levy & 
Hynes, Highlights of the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act, 83 111. B.J. 647 (1995). Under 
UIFSA, once one court enters a support order, no 
other court may modify that order for as long as the 
obligee, obligor, or child for whose benefit the order 
is entered continues to reside within the jurisdiction 
of that court unless each party consents in writing to 
another jurisdiction. See G.L. c. 209D, § 2-205; 
Alaska Stat. § 25.25.205 (Michie 1996). 
FN5. As a condition for receiving Federal funding 
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children all 
States are now required to adopt UIFSA by January 
1, 1998. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f), inserted by Pub.L. 
No. 104-193, § 321, 110 Stat. 2221. 
FN6. The Commonwealth never adopted the 
Revised Uniform Enforcement of Support Act. 9B 
U.L.A. 91 (Master ed. Supp.1996). 
The parties' submissions to the District Court 
addressed their claims only under URESA, and we 
assume that the findings of the District Court were 
made pursuant to URESA. Alaska now argues that 
UIFSA applies to this appeal, and that even if 
URESA applies, the findings of the District Court 
must be affirmed. The core argument advanced by 
Brenckle is that the District Court was precluded by 
URESA from entering a judgment against him for 
child support arrearages, first, because at the time 
the order was entered in the court below he owed no 
duty of support to his child [FN7]; and second, 
because URESA did not provide for the collection of 
child support arrearages. He does not address any 
of Alaska's UIFSA arguments. 
FN7. Brenckle argues that his duty to support his 
son terminated on July 15, 1992, when his son 
reached the age of majority. See Apkin v. 
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 428 n. 
3, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988). 
**393 The Massachusetts codification of UIFSA 
refers to its predecessor URESA only once. 
General Laws c. 209D, § 2-207(c) provides that any 
URESA action that is "pending or was previously 
adjudicated" in the District Court or Boston 
Municipal Court Department "may be transferred to 
the probate and family court department" by any 
party or by a child support enforcement agency, and 
that "[u]pon transfer" the provisions *219 of UIFSA 
shall apply. G.L. c. 209D, § 2-207 (c). [FN8] It is 
clear that the Legislature intended that all URESA 
proceedings in the Commonwealth be moved to a 
single trial department, and that all URESA 
proceedings, whether pending or previously 
adjudicated, be subject to the provisions of UIFSA. 
This is consistent with the fundamental purpose of 
UIFSA: to "create a uniform basis for jurisdiction 
so that ... only one support order is in effect at any 
one time," and to "limit the number of tribunals 
having jurisdiction to modify a child support order." 
1995 House Doc. No. 255 at 24. We must 
nevertheless resolve whether UIFSA can be applied 
retroactively to this case. 
FN8. We note that this subsection of UIFSA is not 
part of the uniform law as drafted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and was added by the Massachusetts 
Legislature. See § 207 of UIFSA, 9 U.L.A. 278 
(Mastered. Supp.1996). 
The retroactive application of a statute is a subject 
we have addressed on many occasions. We have 
applied the rule described in Hanscom v. Maiden & 
Melrose Gaslight Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E. 
426 (1914): "The general rule of interpretation is 
that all statutes are prospective in their operation, 
unless an intention that they shall be retrospective 
appears by necessary implication from their words, 
context or objects when considered in the light of the 
subject matter, the pre-existing state of the law and 
the effect upon existing rights, remedies and 
obligations.... It is only statutes regulating practice, 
procedure and evidence, in short, those relating to 
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remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that 
commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and 
as applying to pending actions or causes of action." 
[1] It was the express intention of the Legislature 
that UIFSA be applied retrospectively; its 
provisions govern any URESA action that is 
"pending or was previously adjudicated." It is also 
clear that UIFSA, like its predecessor URESA, does 
not create a duty of support, [FN9] but rather 
provides the procedural framework for enforcing 
one State's support order in another *220 
jurisdiction. As a remedial statute, and one not 
affecting substantive rights, it is proper that UIFSA 
should be applied retroactively. [FN10] Hein-
Werner Corp. v. Jackson Indus., 364 Mass. 523, 
525, 306 N.E.2d 440 (1974), and cases cited. We 
recognize that there are limitations to the extent to 
which even procedural or remedial statutes will 
operate retroactively. See City Council of Waltham 
v. Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 624, 627, 307 N.E.2d 316 
(1974); Martell v. Moffatt, 276 Mass. 174, 177 
N.E. 102 (1931). We have examined Brenckle's 
claims under both UIFSA and URESA; because we 
conclude that none of his substantive rights is 
impaired by proceeding under either statute, it is 
particularly appropriate to apply UIFSA 
retroactively in this case. 
FN9. See Keene v. Toth, 335 Mass. 591, 593, 141 
N.E.2d 509 (1957) ( "[URESA's] purpose is to 
provide an effective procedure to compel 
performance by a person who is under a duty to 
support dependents in another State"). See also 
Edwards v. Lateef, 558 A.2d 1144, 1147 
(D.C.1989) (URESA does not "affect or amend a 
substantial right," and is properly characterized as 
remedial); Scully v. Schubert, 155 Vt. 327, 330, 
583 A.2d 93 (1990) ("URESA has a remedial 
purpose and should be construed liberally to 
effectuate its objectives"). 
FN10. Alaska argues that "[i]t does not matter* 
whether the District Court entered its order before 
or after UIFSA was enacted and that "it does not 
matter" that the action has not been "formallyH 
transferred to the Probate and Family Court 
department. In holding, as we do, that UIFSA 
applies to these proceedings, we do not mean to 
suggest that the procedural requirements of the 
statute can be ignored. However, because the 
District Court's finding was entered on the same 
day that URESA was repealed, and because UIFSA 
does not address specifically a URESA case 
pending on appeal, we conclude that the transfer 
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requirements of c. 209D, § 2-207 (c ) are not 
violated in this case. 
We turn now to consider whether the Alaska 
judgment against Brenckle can be enforced **394 
under UIFSA. We begin by recognizing that under 
UIFSA the Alaska court had jurisdiction over 
Brenckle to issue its 1991 judgment. The son is a 
resident of Alaska, and Brenckle resided with him in 
that State from his birth in 1974 until Brenckle 
moved to Massachusetts. Under UIFSA personal 
jurisdiction may be exercised by a State tribunal if 
an individual resided with a child in that State. 
Alaska Stat. § 25.25.201(3). See G.L. c. 209D, § 
2-201(3). Moreover, as we noted before, Brenckle 
has never contested the validity of the Alaska 
judgment and does not do so now. 
[2] Brenckle argues that before it could enforce the 
Alaska judgment the District Court was required to 
make an independent finding that he owed a duty of 
support to his son. No independent finding is 
required. Under UIFSA a support order issued by a 
tribunal [FN 11] of another State may be registered 
in a tribunal of the Commonwealth ("responding 
tribunal," *221 § 1-101[17]) for enforcement. G.L. 
c. 209D, § 6-601. The Alaska judgment is just such 
an order. The procedure for registration is set forth 
in G.L. c. 209D, § 6- 602. [FN12] Carol Brenckle 
and the child support enforcement division of Alaska 
have complied with all of the UIFSA registration 
requirements, and provided all of the information 
required to register the Alaska support order in 
Massachusetts. Once registered, the Alaska order is 
enforceable in the same manner, and is subject to 
the same procedures, as an order issued by a 
Massachusetts court. G.L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (b ). 
UIFSA requires no de novo or independent review 
by a Massachusetts court whether Brenckle owes a 
duty of support to his son. Indeed, requiring an 
independent finding of a duty of support when an 
Alaska court has already made that determination 
would impede and frustrate the purpose of UIFSA. 
[FN13] 
FN11. The UIFSA defines "[tlribunal" as "a court, 
administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity 
authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support 
orders or to determine parentage." G.L. c. 209D, 
§ 1-101(22). 
FN12. General Laws c. 209D, § 6-602, provides, 
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in pertinent part: "(a ) A support order ... of 
another state may be registered in the 
commonwealth by sending the following documents 
and information to the appropriate tribunal in the 
commonwealth: (1) a letter of transmittal to the 
tribunal requesting registration and enforcement; 
(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of all 
orders to be registered, including any modification 
of an order; (3) a sworn statement by the party 
seeking registration or a certified statement by the 
custodian of the records showing the amount of any 
arrearage; (4) the name of the obligor and, if 
known: (i) the obligor's address and social 
security number; (ii) the name and address of the 
obligor's employer and any other source of income 
of the obligor; and (iii) a description and the 
location of property of the obligor in the 
commonwealth not exempt from execution; and 
(5) the name and address of the obligee and, if 
applicable, the agency or person to whom support 
payments are to be remitted, (b ) On receipt of a 
request for registration, the registering tribunal 
shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign 
judgment, together with one copy of the documents 
and information, regardless of their form." 
FN13. It would also deny the court issuing the 
support order the "full faith and credit" of its 
judgment in violation of art. IV, § 1 of the United 
States Constitution, and would violate the full faith 
and credit of child support orders act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B (1994), which requires the appropriate 
authorities of each State to enforce child support 
orders made by the initiating court of another 
State, provided that the court had subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the 
parties had reasonable notice and opportunity to be 
heard. Id. at § 1738B (c). The statute forbids 
State child support enforcement authorities from 
modifying another State's child support order 
except in limited circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B (a)(2), (e) (1994). 
Under UIFSA, a party contesting the validity or 
enforcement of a registered order or seeking to 
vacate the registration, has the burden of proving 
one or more of the defenses *222 specifically 
provided by G.L. c. 209D, § 6- 607. [FN14] 
Brenckle has not articulated his claims as "defenses" 
under UIFSA. Nevertheless, we have reviewed all 
of the claims that he has made, both in the court 
below and on appeal, as well as the record 
supporting such claims, and conclude that none of 
his **395 claims is sufficient to constitute a valid 
defense under UIFSA. The Alaska child support 
order must be enforced. G.L. c. 209D, § 6-608. 
FN 14. These defenses are: "(1) the issuing 
tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
contesting party; (2) the order was obtained by 
fraud; (3) the order has been vacated, suspended, 
or modified by a later order; (4) the issuing 
tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal; (5) 
there is a defense under the law of the 
commonwealth to the remedy sought; (6) full or 
partial payment has been made; or (7) the statute 
of limitations ... precludes enforcement of some or 
all of the arrearages." G.L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (a ). 
While we hold that UIFSA is the statute applicable 
to these proceedings, we shall review each of 
Brenckle's claims under URESA. We do so because 
it is arguable that some of the claims he makes 
under URESA could be viewed as defenses under 
UIFSA. Moreover, had URESA precluded 
enforcement of the Alaska judgment, it is arguable 
that the application of UIFSA to this appeal could 
have affected Brenckle's substantive rights. We 
conclude that his claims under URESA also lack 
merit and that the District Court was correct in 
finding that the Alaska judgment could be enforced 
under URESA. 
We turn first to consider again his argument that 
the District Court was required to make an 
independent finding that he had an existing duty of 
support at the time of the Massachusetts proceedings 
because URESA, unlike UIFSA, did require such a 
finding. For several independent and sufficient 
reasons the court below was correct to conclude that 
Brenckle did owe a duty of support that could be 
enforced in Massachusetts under URESA. First, 
URESA defined a duty of support as "any duty of 
support imposed by law, or by any court order, 
decree or judgement." G.L. c. 273A, § 1, repealed 
by St. 1995 c. 105. The court order obtained by 
Carol Brenckle in Alaska itself constituted a duty of 
support, and the District Court could have so found. 
Moreover, Brenckle's interpretation of his divorce 
agreement is unpersuasive. The Alaska judgment 
was obtained by Carol Brenckle before their son 
reached the age of majority, and there was no 
requirement under URESA that the child remain a 
minor while the *223 custodial parent pursued the 
father for delinquent support payments. In addition, 
the divorce agreement specifically provided that 
Brenckle would contribute to his son's college and 
graduate school expenses, and it was for this very 
purpose that Carol Brenckle was seeking support. 
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[FN15] 
FN15. Even in the absence of the express 
agreement between the Brenckles, the District 
Court could have found Brenckle liable under 
Massachusetts law to support his son in college. 
Our law provides that a "court may make 
appropriate orders of maintenance, support and 
education of any child who has attained age 
eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one 
and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and 
is principally dependant upon said parent for 
maintenance," and that a court may order support 
for "any child who has attained age twenty-one but 
who has not attained age twenty- three, if such 
child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is 
principally dependent upon said parent for 
maintenance due to the enrollment of such child in 
an educational program." G.L. c. 208, § 28. The 
District Court had the authority to order Brenckle 
to make the payments to Carol Brenckle for the 
support of their son. 
Brenckle next maintains that the District Court 
could not find him liable because URESA did not 
provide explicitly for the payment of child support 
arrearages. We do not agree. URESA provided 
that the responding State, here Massachusetts, "may 
order the respondent to furnish support or 
reimbursement therefor" when presented with a 
child support judgment of another State (emphasis 
supplied). G.L. c. 273A, § 10. To pay for their 
son's college expenses Carol Brenckle sought 
"reimbursement" for the support that she had 
provided to him over many years in the absence of 
all support from his father. Although URESA does 
not use the word "arrearages," there is nothing 
talismanic about that term and Carol Brenckle was 
fully entitled to invoke URESA to obtain 
reimbursement for the support she alone had 
provided to their son. See Tande v. Bongiovanni, 
139 Ariz. 346, 348, 678 P.2d 531 (Ct.App.), affd. 
in part, 142 Ariz. 120, 688 P.2d 1012 (1984). 
Moreover, while URESA was in effect, the 
Legislature established a child support enforcement 
division within the department, [FN 16] which was 
authorized to institute collection procedures for "all 
arrearages" that had accrued against child support 
payments owed pursuant to a judgment or support 
order, including *224 URESA orders. G.L. c. 
119A, § 6 (a ). [FN17] The Legislature **396 
would not have granted such authority to the 
department if it did not intend to compel payment of 
arrearages sought under URESA. 
FN16. See Title IV, Part D of the Social Security 
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1994). G.L. c. 
119A, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 10B. 
FN 17. On the repeal of URESA and the enactment 
of UIFSA, G.L. c. 119A, § 6, was amended, 
St. 1995, c. 5, § 62, and now provides procedures 
for the enforcement of judgments or for the 
enforcement of support or custody orders entered 
under UIFSA. 
Brenckle next argues that because Alaska did not 
provide any support to Carol Brenckle it had no 
standing to bring this action. He relies on § 5 of 
URESA, G.L. c. 273A, § 5, now repealed, which 
provided that "[w]henever any state or political 
division thereof has furnished support to an obligee 
it shall have the same right to commence 
proceedings under this chapter...." While URESA 
conferred on a State the ability to collect payments it 
had made, such payments are not a condition 
precedent for the right of the State to bring an action 
against a delinquent parent. Massachusetts has a 
strong interest in ensuring that child support 
payments are made by the responsible parent. 
Absent a specific statutory exception we decline to 
conclude that the Legislature intended to create any 
barrier to the collection of support payments. 
[FN 18] Alaska was authorized to pursue this action 
on behalf of Carol Brenckle. 
FN18. We observe that Federal law requires State 
child support enforcement agencies to provide 
services to all constituents, regardless whether the 
particular constituent receives financial assistance 
from the State. 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1995). Under 
prior Alaska law, its child support enforcement 
division was authorized to administer and enforce 
URESA, Alaska Stat. § 25.27.020(3), and was 
required to provide services to any petitioner 
seeking support pursuant to that statute. Alaska 
Stat. § 25.27.020(7) (Michie 1996). Effective 
January 1, 1996, Alaska is authorized by UIFSA to 
follow the procedures set forth in URESA. Alaska 
Stat. § 25.27.020(3) (Michie 1996). The 
Massachusetts child support enforcement division 
provides the same services to aggrieved parties in 
this Commonwealth. See G.L. c. 119A, § 6. 
Finally, Brenckle argues that, because Carol 
Brenckle declined to request the assistance of the 
Alaska child support enforcement division at the 
time the marriage was dissolved, [FN19] she is 
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precluded from seeking its assistance now. His 
argument finds no support in the language of the 
statute, and we are aware of no holding to that 
effect. 
FN 19. In their petition for the dissolution of their 
marriage, the couple agreed that it was "not 
necessary" for child support payments to be made 
through the Alaska child support enforcement 
division. 
[3] *225 In addition to his claims under URESA, 
Brenckle argues that his former wife is barred by 
laches from pursuing him for unpaid child support 
obligations because she "slumbered on her rights" 
for thirteen years, made no attempt to contact him 
for support payments, and because she "consciously 
chose to forfeit" her rights to collect child support 
payments from him. [FN20] We disagree. Because 
Brenckle's failure to make child support payments 
became vested as judgments by operation of law, the 
defense of laches is not available to him. Capone v. 
Caponi, 350 Mass. 766, 213 N.E.2d 924 (1966). 
[FN21] Moreover, for more than fifteen years 
Brenckle has failed absolutely to fulfil the duties that 
he owes to his son. Even now Brenckle attempts to 
relieve himself of all of his responsibilities to his 
son, including the payment for his son's college 
education to which he agreed at the time of the 
divorce. We decline to hold that a child forfeits the 
protection of one parent because the custodial parent 
does not take immediate measures **397 to enforce 
delinquent child support obligations. 
of limitations precludes this enforcement action. 
As the statute of limitations is one of the defenses 
recognized under UIFSA, we pause to note that no 
such claim is available to him. The Legislature has 
determined that a delinquent payment of child 
support is "a judgment by operation of law." G.L. 
c. 119A, § 13 (a ). This statute applied to URESA 
and is now applicable to the provisions of UIFSA. 
Id. Alaska law is to the same effect. Alaska Stat. § 
25.27.225 ("A support order ordering a 
noncustodial parent obligor to make periodic 
support payments to the custodian of a child is a 
judgment that becomes vested when each payment 
becomes due and unpaid"). The statute of 
limitations in Massachusetts for enforcement of 
judgments is twenty years. G.L. c. 260, § 20. 
However calculated, these proceedings were 
commenced within the applicable time period. 
FN21. See also G.L. c. 119A, § 13 (a ), (d ), 
which provides that any payment or installment of 
support implemented under UIFSA is entitled to 
full faith and credit by the courts of this 
Commonwealth. Federal law also requires that the 
Commonwealth afford full faith and credit to child 
support orders issued by other States. 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B (a). 
We affirm the judgment of the District Court. The 
case is remanded to the District Court where it shall 
be transferred to the Probate and Family Court 
Department for such other proceedings as may be 
necessary to enforce the judgment. 
So ordered. 
FN20. Brenckle has never claimed that any statute END OF DOCUMENT 
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